Is a Thomistic Teory of Intentionality Consistent with Physicalism?
I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosoph...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2017]
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| In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Anno: 2017, Volume: 91, Fascicolo: 1, Pagine: 1-28 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
KING, Peter
B Logical Positivism B Intentionality (Philosophy) B PASNAU, Robert B Naturalistic Fallacy |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | I argue that a Thomistic theory of intentionality is both philosophically plausible and inconsistent with physicalism. I begin by distinguishing two types of intentionality and two senses in which something can be said to be non-physical. After sketching the relevant background hylomorphic philosophy of nature, I develop a Tomistic theory of intentionality that supports a certain kind of anti-physicalism. I then consider criticisms of the Tomistic theory of intentionality raised by Peter King and Robert Pasnau. In reply I argue that (a) King's position would have the Scholastics adopt an approach to intentionality that fails to solve the very problem such a theory is supposed to address; and (b) contrary to Pasnau's objection, there are ample resources available to show that the Tomist does not commit a content fallacy. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-8441 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpq20161212104 |
