A defense of modal appearances
I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives t...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2021
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2021, Volume: 89, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 243-261 |
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Modalità
/ Epistemologische Überzeugung
/ Prova ontologica dell'esistenza di Dio
/ Dualismo
/ Dualismo cartesiano
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| Notazioni IxTheo: | AB Filosofia delle religioni VA Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Conceivability
B Phenomenal Conservatism B Ontological Argument B Modal epistemology B Dualism |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives the intuitively correct results. I conclude by considering how it can be used to defend two controversial modal arguments, a Cartesian argument for dualism and an ontological argument for the existence of God. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3 |
