A defense of modal appearances
I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives t...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2021
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 89, Issue: 3, Pages: 243-261 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Modality
/ Epistemologische Überzeugung
/ Ontological proof of God's existence
/ Dualism
/ Cartesian dualism
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Conceivability
B Phenomenal Conservatism B Ontological Argument B Modal epistemology B Dualism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives the intuitively correct results. I conclude by considering how it can be used to defend two controversial modal arguments, a Cartesian argument for dualism and an ontological argument for the existence of God. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3 |