A defense of modal appearances
I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives t...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
2021
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2021, Volume: 89, Numéro: 3, Pages: 243-261 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Modalité
/ Epistemologische Überzeugung
/ Preuve ontologique de l’existence de Dieu
/ Dualisme
/ Dualisme cartésien
|
| Classifications IxTheo: | AB Philosophie de la religion VA Philosophie |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Conceivability
B Phenomenal Conservatism B Ontological Argument B Modal epistemology B Dualism |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives the intuitively correct results. I conclude by considering how it can be used to defend two controversial modal arguments, a Cartesian argument for dualism and an ontological argument for the existence of God. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3 |
