A defense of modal appearances
I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives t...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2021
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| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 89, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 243-261 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Τροπικότητα (γλωσσολογία)
/ Epistemologische Überzeugung
/ Οντολογική απόδειξη της ύπαρξης του Θεού
/ Δυισμός <μοτίβο>
/ Καρτεσιανός δυϊσμός
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Conceivability
B Phenomenal Conservatism B Ontological Argument B Modal epistemology B Dualism |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives the intuitively correct results. I conclude by considering how it can be used to defend two controversial modal arguments, a Cartesian argument for dualism and an ontological argument for the existence of God. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09779-3 |
