Justice in circumstances of transition: comments on Colleen Murphy’s theory of transitional justice as justice of a special type
Colleen Murphy has argued that in circumstances of societal transition only one special type of justice is applicable: ‘transitional justice’, a type of justice not reducible to any other type or types (such as retributive, distributive, restorative or corrective justice). I take issue with Murphy’s...
| Published in: | Journal of global ethics |
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| Subtitles: | Symposium: Colleen Murphy: The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice |
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
[2018]
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| In: |
Journal of global ethics
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| Further subjects: | B
Corrective justice
B Restorative Justice B Distributive Justice B Transitional justice B Retributive Justice |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Summary: | Colleen Murphy has argued that in circumstances of societal transition only one special type of justice is applicable: ‘transitional justice’, a type of justice not reducible to any other type or types (such as retributive, distributive, restorative or corrective justice). I take issue with Murphy’s conclusion, showing that retributive, distributive and corrective justice all feature as isolable component parts in her own positive account of transitional justice. I also argue that restorative justice is applicable and important in transitional societies when the state itself has perpetrated serious wrongs. Murphy claims that each distinct type of justice is a response to a unique ‘basic problem of justice’, triggered by a background set of ‘circumstances’. However, I argue that identifying such a basic problem neither necessarily means the circumstances in question call for a unique type of justice, nor is sufficient to determine which type of justice is most salient in the circumstances. What is more, I show that Murphy applies her own methodology inconsistently in her treatment of transitional societies and stable democracies. I argue that what Murphy calls ‘transitional justice’ is composed of familiar types of justice as well as other moral values, but also regrettable - though often unavoidable - injustice. |
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| ISSN: | 1744-9634 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of global ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2018.1506998 |