Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks
In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wron...
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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| En: |
Bioethics
Año: 2020, Volumen: 34, Número: 8, Páginas: 862-864 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCH Ética de la medicina |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Killing
B Ethics B Harm B Impairment B Pro-life B Feto B Abortion |
| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Sumario: | In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the n+1 degree (to cause the fetus to be more impaired than to have FAS); (c) killing the fetus impairs the fetus to the n+1 degree (causes it to be more impaired than to have FAS); (d) abortion kills the fetus; (e) therefore, abortion is immoral. The impairment argument is a promising account for the wrongness of abortion because it does not rely on the controversial metaphysical premise that a fetus is a person. This article aims to show, that despite some immediate advantages over the rival theories of the immorality of abortion there is a reason to believe that the impairment argument is untenable. That is because there are goods that can be achieved by abortion but that cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral (2019)"
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| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12720 |