On the impairment argument
Most opposition to abortion stands or falls on whether a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. In her influential paper ‘A defense of abortion,’ Judith Jarvis Thomson effectively sidesteps this issue, assuming the fetus is a person with the right to life yet arguing thi...
| Published in: | Bioethics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2021
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| In: |
Bioethics
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| IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCH Medical ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
impairment argument
B Judith Jarvis Thomson B letting die / killing B Abortion B Moral Luck B Personhood |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Most opposition to abortion stands or falls on whether a fetus is the sort of being whose life it is seriously wrong to end. In her influential paper ‘A defense of abortion,’ Judith Jarvis Thomson effectively sidesteps this issue, assuming the fetus is a person with the right to life yet arguing this alone does not give it the right to use the mother’s body. In a recent article, Perry Hendricks takes inspiration from Thomson and assumes the fetus is not a person, arguing that abortion is wrong because causing fetal impairment is wrong and abortion is worse than causing fetal impairment. Here I argue Hendricks’ impairment argument fails. For Hendricks, risking fetal impairment is wrong because it risks harm to a future person, but if we assume the fetus is not a person, abortion doesn’t harm anyone, it merely prevents them from existing. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral (2019)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12844 |