The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply

In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Bioethics
Main Author: Blackshaw, Bruce P. (Author)
Contributors: Hendricks, Perry (Bibliographic antecedent) ; Hendricks, Perry C. (Bibliographic antecedent)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell [2019]
In: Bioethics
IxTheo Classification:NBE Anthropology
NCH Medical ethics
Further subjects:B impairment argument
B fetal alcohol syndrome
B Abortion
B Personhood
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro-choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.
ISSN:1467-8519
Reference:Kritik von "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral (2019)"
Kritik in "(Regrettably) Abortion remains immoral (2019)"
Contains:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12576