Theology, Free Will, and the Skeptical Challenge from the Sciences
Given how central free will and moral responsibility are for theology, Christian theologians should not remain at the sidelines when scientists and philosophers debate recent empirical results about human agency. In this article, the core notion of free will is identified with the agent's cogni...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Routledge
2020
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| Στο/Στη: |
Theology and science
Έτος: 2020, Τόμος: 18, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 391-409 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | CF Χριστιανισμός και Επιστήμη NBE Ανθρωπολογία VA Φιλοσοφία ZD Ψυχολογία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Free Will
B Neuroscience B Pluralism B eliminativism B The Self B Moral Responsibility B Theological Anthropology |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | Given how central free will and moral responsibility are for theology, Christian theologians should not remain at the sidelines when scientists and philosophers debate recent empirical results about human agency. In this article, the core notion of free will is identified with the agent's cognitive ability to exert control over his or her actions thereby making moral responsibility possible. Then three scientifically inspired arguments for free will skepticism are outlined: the argument from eliminativism, the argument from determinism and the argument from epiphenomenalism. The remainder of the article explores novel responses to these arguments and draws some theological implications from them. |
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| ISSN: | 1474-6719 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Theology and science
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/14746700.2020.1786218 |