The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply
In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that...
| Publié dans: | Bioethics |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Collaborateurs: | ; |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2019]
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| Dans: |
Bioethics
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| Classifications IxTheo: | NBE Anthropologie NCH Éthique médicale |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
impairment argument
B fetal alcohol syndrome B Abortion B Personhood |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro-choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Référence: | Kritik von "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral (2019)"
Kritik in "(Regrettably) Abortion remains immoral (2019)" |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12576 |