Willing Belief
In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer offers resourceful arguments against each of non-reductive realism, reductive realism, and non-cognitivism, in order to motivate his version of the normative error theory, according to which normative predicates ascribe properties that do not exist. In this cont...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2018]
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2018, Volume: 8, Issue: 4, Pages: 300-321 |
| Further subjects: | B
Reduction
B Non-cognitivism B Error Theory B supervenience B Bart Streumer |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer offers resourceful arguments against each of non-reductive realism, reductive realism, and non-cognitivism, in order to motivate his version of the normative error theory, according to which normative predicates ascribe properties that do not exist. In this contribution, I argue that none of the steps of this master argument succeed, and that Streumer's arguments leave puzzles about what it means to ascribe a property at all. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "Précis of Unbelievable Errors (2018)"
Kritisiert in "Response to Jackson, Stratton-Lake, and Schroeder (2018)" |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20181327 |
