Moral Reasons as Other-Regarding Reasons
Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent...
| Pubblicato in: | Ethical perspectives |
|---|---|
| Autore principale: | |
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Peeters
[2018]
|
| In: |
Ethical perspectives
|
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Morale
/ Dovere
/ Sé
/ L'altro
|
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NCB Etica individuale VA Filosofia |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent has to treat other individuals in certain ways, for their own sakes. Conversely, an agent never has a moral reason to treat herself in any way, for her own sake. This means that an agent's moral obligations are limited to the obligations she has regarding her treatment of other individuals and she never has a moral obligation regarding the treatment of herself. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.25.2.3284948 |