Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?
A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wan...
| VerfasserInnen: | ; |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Lade...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[2018]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2018, Band: 21, Heft: 3, Seiten: 699-717 |
| IxTheo Notationen: | NCA Ethik VA Philosophie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Self-other asymmetry
B social practices B Reasons B Categorical B Responsibility |
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Volltext (Verlag) |
| Zusammenfassung: | A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1 |
