Moral Reasons as Other-Regarding Reasons

Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethical perspectives
Main Author: Gronholz, Shane (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Peeters [2018]
In: Ethical perspectives
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Morals / Duty / Self / The Other
IxTheo Classification:NCB Personal ethics
VA Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent has to treat other individuals in certain ways, for their own sakes. Conversely, an agent never has a moral reason to treat herself in any way, for her own sake. This means that an agent's moral obligations are limited to the obligations she has regarding her treatment of other individuals and she never has a moral obligation regarding the treatment of herself.
ISSN:1783-1431
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2143/EP.25.2.3284948