Moral Reasons as Other-Regarding Reasons
Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent...
| Publié dans: | Ethical perspectives |
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| Auteur principal: | |
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Peeters
[2018]
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| Dans: |
Ethical perspectives
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| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Morale
/ Devoir
/ Soi
/ Autrui
|
| Classifications IxTheo: | NCB Éthique individuelle VA Philosophie |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent has to treat other individuals in certain ways, for their own sakes. Conversely, an agent never has a moral reason to treat herself in any way, for her own sake. This means that an agent's moral obligations are limited to the obligations she has regarding her treatment of other individuals and she never has a moral obligation regarding the treatment of herself. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.25.2.3284948 |