Moral Reasons as Other-Regarding Reasons
Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent...
| Τόπος έκδοσης: | Ethical perspectives |
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Peeters
[2018]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical perspectives
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| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Ήθος (μοτίβο)
/ Καθήκον (μοτίβο)
/ Εαυτός (μοτίβο)
/ Ο Άλλος
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCB Ατομική Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | Is it possible for an agent to morally wrong herself or are our moral obligations limited to our treatment of others? In this article, I aim to defend a view about what is distinctive about moral reasons and moral obligations. In particular, I argue that moral reasons are only those reasons an agent has to treat other individuals in certain ways, for their own sakes. Conversely, an agent never has a moral reason to treat herself in any way, for her own sake. This means that an agent's moral obligations are limited to the obligations she has regarding her treatment of other individuals and she never has a moral obligation regarding the treatment of herself. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.25.2.3284948 |