Why the Perfect Being Theologian Cannot Endorse the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
I argue that perfect being theologians cannot endorse the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (AP). On perfect being theology, God is essentially morally perfect, meaning that He always acts in a morally perfect manner. I argue that it is possible that God is faced with a situation in which there...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2017]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
God
/ Fulfilment
/ Moral act
/ Alternative
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Further subjects: | B
Compatibilism
B Perfect Being Theology B Freedom B Anselm B PAP |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | I argue that perfect being theologians cannot endorse the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (AP). On perfect being theology, God is essentially morally perfect, meaning that He always acts in a morally perfect manner. I argue that it is possible that God is faced with a situation in which there is only one morally perfect action, which He must do. If this is true, then God acts without alternative possibilities in this situation. Yet, unless one says that this choice is not free, one must say that God has acted freely without alternative possibilities. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i4.2002 |