Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument
Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131-151, ) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom ( CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the conte...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
2015
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| Em: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2015, Volume: 77, Número: 3, Páginas: 231-246 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Molinism
B Consequence argument B FREE will & determinism B Accidental necessity B Libertarianism B Compatibilism B Argumento B Grace (Theology) B Middle Knowledge |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | Perszyk (Faith Philos 20:131-151, ) has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom ( CCFs) and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga (in: Molinism: the contemporary debate, ) has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga's understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk's challenge by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-014-9473-2 |
