An Inconsistency in Craig's Defence of the Moral Argument
I argue that William Craigs defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate ac...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2012]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2012, Volume: 4, Fascicolo: 4, Pagine: 49-58 |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |