An Inconsistency in Craig's Defence of the Moral Argument
I argue that William Craigs defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate ac...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2012]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2012, Volume: 4, Issue: 4, Pages: 49-58 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | I argue that William Craigs defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craigs defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory (DCT). Craigs version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections but Craig fails to provide an adequate account of why these connections hold. Thus, Craigs critique of non-theistic moral realism is at odds with his DCT. Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of his defence of the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v4i4.259 |