Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?
In his Ontological proof, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2011]
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| Em: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2011, Volume: 3, Número: 1, Páginas: 161-169 |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Resumo: | In his Ontological proof, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false. |
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| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v3i1.386 |