Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?
In his Ontological proof, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads...
| Published in: | European journal for philosophy of religion |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2011]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In his Ontological proof, Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property f: If f is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v3i1.386 |