From Emergence Theory to Panpsychism: A Philosophical Evaluation of Nancey Murphys Non-reductive Physicalism
In this article, I offer a critical evaluation of non-reductive physicalism as articulated and defended by Nancey Murphy. I argue that (A) the examples given by Murphy do not illustrate robust emergence and the philosophical idea of downward causation. (B) The thesis of multiple realizability is ont...
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2016]
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| In: |
Sophia
Year: 2016, 卷: 55, 发布: 3, Pages: 381-394 |
| IxTheo Classification: | CF Christianity and Science NBE Anthropology VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Causal powers
B Nancey Murphy B Panpsychism B emergence theory |
| 在线阅读: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| 总结: | In this article, I offer a critical evaluation of non-reductive physicalism as articulated and defended by Nancey Murphy. I argue that (A) the examples given by Murphy do not illustrate robust emergence and the philosophical idea of downward causation. (B) The thesis of multiple realizability is ontologically neutral, and so cannot support the idea of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties. (C) Supervenience is incompatible with strong emergence. I also argue for the fruitful relationship between emergence theory and panpsychism pertaining to the metaphysical issue of the origin and nature of mind. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-016-0550-0 |
