From Emergence Theory to Panpsychism: A Philosophical Evaluation of Nancey Murphys Non-reductive Physicalism
In this article, I offer a critical evaluation of non-reductive physicalism as articulated and defended by Nancey Murphy. I argue that (A) the examples given by Murphy do not illustrate robust emergence and the philosophical idea of downward causation. (B) The thesis of multiple realizability is ont...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2016]
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| В: |
Sophia
Год: 2016, Том: 55, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 381-394 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | CF Христианство и наука NBE Антропология VA Философия |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Causal powers
B Nancey Murphy B Panpsychism B emergence theory |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Итог: | In this article, I offer a critical evaluation of non-reductive physicalism as articulated and defended by Nancey Murphy. I argue that (A) the examples given by Murphy do not illustrate robust emergence and the philosophical idea of downward causation. (B) The thesis of multiple realizability is ontologically neutral, and so cannot support the idea of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties. (C) Supervenience is incompatible with strong emergence. I also argue for the fruitful relationship between emergence theory and panpsychism pertaining to the metaphysical issue of the origin and nature of mind. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-016-0550-0 |
