On the Infinite God Objection: a Reply to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef
Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that (1) abstract objects do not exist; (2) actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and (3) redefining omniscience as (G): for any proposition p, if God conscious...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Άλλοι συγγραφείς: | |
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
[2016]
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Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 55, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 263-272 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός NBC Δόγμα του Θεού |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Kalam Cosmological Argument
B Omniscience B Infinite God objection B Abstract objects |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
Σύνοψη: | Erasmus and Verhoef suggest that a promising response to the infinite God objection to the Kalām cosmological argument include showing that (1) abstract objects do not exist; (2) actually infinite knowledge is impossible; and (3) redefining omniscience as (G): for any proposition p, if God consciously thinks about p, God will either accept p as true if and only if p is true, or accept p as false if and only if p is false. I argue that there is insufficient motivation for showing (1) and (2) and that (G) is problematic as a definition of omniscience. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Αναφορά: | Kritik von "The Kalam Cosmological Argument and the Infinite God Objection (2015)"
Kritik in "Loke on the Infinite God Objection (2018)" |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-016-0539-8 |