Frames, Choice-Reversal, and Consent
Recently Jason Hanna has argued that a particular type of susceptibility to framing effectsnamely, the tendency to reverse ones choice between certain logically equivalent framesinvalidates actual tokens of consent. Here I argue that this claim is false: proneness to choice-reversal per se betwee...
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[2015]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2015, Band: 18, Heft: 5, Seiten: 1049-1057 |
| IxTheo Notationen: | NCA Ethik ZD Psychologie |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Rights
B Consent B Framing effects B Autonomy |
| Online-Zugang: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Recently Jason Hanna has argued that a particular type of susceptibility to framing effectsnamely, the tendency to reverse ones choice between certain logically equivalent framesinvalidates actual tokens of consent. Here I argue that this claim is false: proneness to choice-reversal per se between the relevant types of frames does not invalidate consent. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9581-9 |
