Der Volksaufstand vom 17. Juni 1953 und sein historisch-politischer Kontext
On June 11th 1953 the East German authorities were ordered by their Soviet masters to change their political strategy abruptly and to bring to an end their policy of repression and forcible social transformation. This seemed to be a capitulation to the feelings of popular grievance. But in one respe...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht
2004
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| In: |
Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte
Year: 2004, Volume: 17, Issue: 1, Pages: 44-62 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
Non-electronic |
| Summary: | On June 11th 1953 the East German authorities were ordered by their Soviet masters to change their political strategy abruptly and to bring to an end their policy of repression and forcible social transformation. This seemed to be a capitulation to the feelings of popular grievance. But in one respect the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) remained firm. They refused to repeal the proposed increase in working hours and productivity expectations. The feelings of outrage prompted by these measures were first expressed in East Berlin where on June 16th construction workers staged strikes and demonstrations. The movement quickly took on political overtones. There were soon calls for the resignation of the government and for free elections. The Western Powers were totally surprised by such developments in East Berlin. Even the West German secret service information agency, the "Gehlen Organization", failed to see the significance of these events, as we now know from surviving Stasi documents — which disproves the long-held Communist theory that the Western Powers had secretly and deliberately instigated the whole uprising. The West Berlin radio station RIAS, however, reacted with much quicker and more accurate reporting. Since these broadcasts could be heard throughout most of East Germany, they undoubtedly played a part in the escalation of the uprising. On the following day, June 17th, there were demonstrations in all parts of East Germany. The centres of power were attacked by storm, while the police and secret security forces were largely helpless. Only after the proclamation of an Emergency Decree and the arrival of Soviet troops could the situation be stabilized again. Nevertheless, the impact on the communist rulers was such that their future security policy was largely influenced by the fear of a repetition of such uprisings. |
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| ISSN: | 2196-808X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte
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