On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno

In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, bu...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Trakakis, Nick (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands 2003
In: Sophia
Year: 2003, Volume: 42, Issue: 2, Pages: 99-106
Further subjects:B Human Freedom
B Adequate Explanation
B Free Action
B Free Agency
B Moral Evil
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies.
ISSN:1873-930X
Contains:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/BF02782401