¿Por qué la criatura no puede crear?: Una respuesta desde Tomás de Aquino
For Thomas Aquinas (except for a small impasse at the beginning of his teaching when he commented on the Sentences), as for the Parisian masters, it is clear that creatures cannot create. Now, denying a possibility is not tantamount to justifying it, and Aquinas takes care to argue for this impossib...
Subtitles: | Why cannot Creatures Create?$dAn Answer from Thomas Aquinas |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | Spanish |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
2021
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In: |
Scripta theologica
Year: 2021, Volume: 53, Issue: 2, Pages: 333-361 |
IxTheo Classification: | KAE Church history 900-1300; high Middle Ages NBD Doctrine of Creation |
Further subjects: | B
Instrumentalidad
B Creation B Cause B Creación B Instrumentality B Thomas Aquinas B Tomás de Aquino B esse |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | For Thomas Aquinas (except for a small impasse at the beginning of his teaching when he commented on the Sentences), as for the Parisian masters, it is clear that creatures cannot create. Now, denying a possibility is not tantamount to justifying it, and Aquinas takes care to argue for this impossibility in the various places where he addresses the subject of creation. This, in fact, involves two distinct problems: on the one hand, it is a matter of determining what is the limit of the creature- 's causality and, on the other, how it can participate in divine causality. The arguments presented by Aquinas reveal the metaphysical background of the question and manifest his understanding of the causality of the creatures. Para Tomás de Aquino (salvo un pequeño impasse al inicio de su enseñanza cuando comentaba las Sentencias), lo mismo que para los maestros parisienses, es claro que las criaturas no pueden crear. Ahora bien, negar una posibilidad no equivale a justificarla, y el Aquinate se esfuerza en argumentar esta imposibilidad en llos distintos lugares donde aborda el tema de la creación. Éste, en realidad, supone dos problemas distintos: por una parte, se trata de eterminar cuál es el límite de la causalidad de la criatura y, por otra, cómo puede participar en la causalidad divina. Los argumentos que presenta Tomás revelan el trasfondo metafísico de la cuestión y manifiestan su comprensión relativa a la causalidad del ente creado. |
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ISSN: | 2254-6227 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Scripta theologica
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.15581/006.53.2.333-361 |