Moral Indulgences: When Offsetting is Wrong
Chapter 5 introduces the concept and explores the permissibility of moral indulgences. Roughly speaking, an agent is morally indulgent when they do something that, absent a defeater, is wrong, and, in order to offset this, do something that is supererogatory and more good than the bad action was bad...
| Authors: | ; |
|---|---|
| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University Press
[2019]
|
| In: |
Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Pages: 68-95 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Moral act
/ Weakness
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCA Ethics NCB Personal ethics |
| Summary: | Chapter 5 introduces the concept and explores the permissibility of moral indulgences. Roughly speaking, an agent is morally indulgent when they do something that, absent a defeater, is wrong, and, in order to offset this, do something that is supererogatory and more good than the bad action was bad. The chapter proceeds to explain why and when being morally indulgent is permissible. For some cases, being morally indulgent appears permissible (as when one buys a large carbon offset after polluting more than one's fair share), while for others, it appears impermissible (as when murdering one but, otherwise unrelatedly, saving two to make up for it). The explanation for when being indulgent is permissible appeals to universalizability of the sort found in forms of Kantianism, contractualism, and rule consequentialism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications for what God should do, and why, if there are no unsurpassable possible worlds. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
|