Disgust as Heuristic
Suppose that disgust can provide evidence of moral wrongdoing. What account of disgust might make sense of this? A recent and promising theory is the social contagion view, proposed by Alexandra Plakias. After criticizing both its descriptive and normative claims, I draw two conclusions. First, we s...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 3, Pages: 679-693 |
IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy ZB Sociology ZD Psychology |
Further subjects: | B
MORAL HEURISTICS
B Disgust B Leon Kass B social contagion B Alexandra Plakias |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Suppose that disgust can provide evidence of moral wrongdoing. What account of disgust might make sense of this? A recent and promising theory is the social contagion view, proposed by Alexandra Plakias. After criticizing both its descriptive and normative claims, I draw two conclusions. First, we should question the wisdom of drawing so straight a line from biological poisons and pathogens to social counterparts. Second, we dont need to explain the evidential value of disgust by appealing to what the response tracks. These lessons point toward an alternative: namely, that disgust is a moral heuristic. On the heuristic view, disgust is a trigger for the subconscious use of a particular rule: < If x is disgusting, and we wouldnt do x, then x is morally wrong. > I show how this view fits with a plausible hypothesis about the social function of disgust, and then apply it to Leon Kasss famous use of repugnance to criticize cloning. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9673-6 |