Ratio ut subiectum peccati : la razón como sujeto de pecado según Tomás de Aquino
The moral order is more convenient to the will because the reason does not formally consider its object sub ratione as good or bad, but as true or false. However, our apprehensive and appetitive faculties influence the sinful consent of the will, making them a subject of sin: hence, we will analyze...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2021
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| In: |
Sapientia
Year: 2021, Volume: 77, Issue: 249, Pages: 71-96 |
| Further subjects: | B
Voluntad
B Orden Moral B Ignorancia B Razon B Tomás de Aquino, Santo, 1225?-1274 B Pecado |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | The moral order is more convenient to the will because the reason does not formally consider its object sub ratione as good or bad, but as true or false. However, our apprehensive and appetitive faculties influence the sinful consent of the will, making them a subject of sin: hence, we will analyze not only the sin of reason, but also that of sensuality. Finally, we will verify that ignorance -originating from reason- is the cause of all sin; we will establish its gravity in relation to its voluntariness and the influence of sensuality on it. El orden moral conviene más a la voluntad que a la razón pues ésta no considera formalmente a su objeto sub ratione de bueno o malo, sino de verdadero o falso. Sin embargo, nuestras potencias aprehensivas y apetitivas influyen el consentimiento pecaminoso de la voluntad y se convierten en sujeto de pecado: de allí que no sólo analizaremos el pecado de razón, sino también, el de sensualidad. Finalmente, comprobaremos que la ignorancia -procedente de la razón- es causa de todo pecado, estableceremos su gravedad con relación a su voluntariedad y el influjo de la sensualidad sobre ésta. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sapientia
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