Acción y sentido en John Dewey
Accoridng to Dewey, human action is explained in the relation between means and consequences. He starts by establishing his conception of knowledge and the function of intelligence. In so far as there are no unchanging and eternal essences, knowledge does not consists in adapting to such realities....
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2006
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| In: |
Sapientia
Year: 2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 219/220, Pages: 171-185 |
| Further subjects: | B
Pragmatismo
B Habito B Metodo Cientifico B Dewey, John, 1859-1952 B Conocimiento B Psicologia |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | Accoridng to Dewey, human action is explained in the relation between means and consequences. He starts by establishing his conception of knowledge and the function of intelligence. In so far as there are no unchanging and eternal essences, knowledge does not consists in adapting to such realities. The influence of James's psychology was important for his epistemological conception, and in his early works, the explanation of ^ human action based on habits and the social environment is already present. His instrumentalism holds that our ideas depend on actions and that moral judgments are objective because all practical judgments are objective. This papen seeks to determine if Dewey can justify such objectivity. Para Dewey, la acción humana se explica en la relación entre medios y consecuencias. Comienza por establecer la concepción del conocimiento y la función de la inteligencia, que no es descubrir la existencia de una realidad a la que deba adecuarse, porque no hay un orden de esencias inmutables e intemporales. La influencia de la psicología de James fue importante para su concepción epistemológica y en sus escritos tempranos ya está presente la explicación de la acción humana originada en los hábitos y el medio social. Su instrumentalismo sostiene que nuestras ideas dependen de las acciones y que los juicios morales son objetivos porque todos los juicios prácticos son objetivos. Este estudio trata de establecer si puede justificar esa objetividad. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Sapientia
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