On Being "Advantageously Unsuited" for Dealing with Evil

I investigate epistemic limits intrinsic to the analytic method of philosophizing used by Michael Rea (Analytic Theology) and Eleonore Stump (Wandering in Darkness). Rea claims analytic tools limited strictly to the purposes of theory building make analytic accounts "advantageously unsuited to...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Bitar, Ray Paul (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2014
In: Toronto journal of theology
Year: 2014, Volume: 30, Issue: 1, Pages: 81-100
Further subjects:B Analytic Theology
B Michael Rea
B Epistemology
B Theodicy
B problem of evil
B Eleonore Stump
B Wandering in Darkness
B tragic evil
B Tragedy
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic
Description
Summary:I investigate epistemic limits intrinsic to the analytic method of philosophizing used by Michael Rea (Analytic Theology) and Eleonore Stump (Wandering in Darkness). Rea claims analytic tools limited strictly to the purposes of theory building make analytic accounts "advantageously unsuited to deal with the reality of evil." Rea's interpretation is conceptually distortive and problematic. I show how his use of the logical-practical distinction is unauthentic in dealing with the challenge of tragic evil and present a broad sketch of what I mean by "tragic." I then elucidate how Rea abuses the epistemic limits of his method by misaiming analytic tools inasmuch as philosophical doubt cuts against any knowledge garnered in the epistemic practices of human beings experiencing evil. I lastly show that Rea's epistemic problems amplify in the theodicy defence of Stump, who uses an artificial construction of evil as suffering of "mentally fully functioning adults" shorn of any socio-historical location. While Stump's artifice of evil and epistemic doubt provides her the possibility for a general reason of moral sufficiency, she is unable to integrate the biblical narratives she expects will lend added epistemic assistance to her defence, so that her project ultimately founders by never really touching ground.
ISSN:1918-6371
Contains:Enthalten in: Toronto journal of theology
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.3138/tjt.2544