Bradley and Lonergan’s Relativist
Bernard Lonergan contrasts his account of judgment with that of the relativist. This paper points out how Lonergan’s characterization of the relativist account of judgment closely resembles the account of judgment that F. H. Bradley had given. Furthermore, the paper points to areas of commonality be...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
1990
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| In: |
Philosophy & theology
Year: 1990, Volume: 5, Issue: 2, Pages: 125-136 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Bernard Lonergan contrasts his account of judgment with that of the relativist. This paper points out how Lonergan’s characterization of the relativist account of judgment closely resembles the account of judgment that F. H. Bradley had given. Furthermore, the paper points to areas of commonality between Lonergan and Bradley with regard to human knowing. Despite their similarities, however, Lonergan’s account of judgment clearly distinguishes his theory of knowing from anything Iike Bradley’s idealism. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-828X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Philosophy & theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/philtheol19905221 |
