Das metaphysische „sein“ bei Aristoteles: Kopula oder Existenzverb?

This article aims at further understanding the meaning and function of the verb “to be” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: does it express mainly or even exclusively existence or is it used as a copula, linking a subject and predicate? Since the birth of Greek literature, the copula-use has been by far the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gutberlet, Albert (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:Italian
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2020
In: Alpha omega
Year: 2020, Volume: 23, Issue: 3, Pages: 441-481
Further subjects:B Negation
B Categories
B copula
B Metaphysics
B Nothing
B Being
B Thought
B Reality
B Affirmation
B negationcategories
B being as truth
B Existence
B Aristotle
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)
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Summary:This article aims at further understanding the meaning and function of the verb “to be” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: does it express mainly or even exclusively existence or is it used as a copula, linking a subject and predicate? Since the birth of Greek literature, the copula-use has been by far the more common, and so it is also with Aristotle. He even provides us with the nucleus of a theory of the copula, which is not the case with existence in the strict philosophical sense. Analyzing Met. V, 7, VI, 4 and VIII, 2, I conclude that wherever Aristotle tries to determine, what, for being as being, it means “to be”, he refers not to existence, but to some concrete being-such, where the verb “being” functions as a copula. So while metaphysical being does also consistently carry an existential force, regarding its syntactic function it is nonetheless copulative through and through.
Contains:Enthalten in: Alpha omega