Divine Simplicity and the Theory of Action: Extrinsic Willing and Knowing Against the Modal Collapse Argument
The modal collapse argument states that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity entails that God necessarily creates whatever he creates and also that all creatures necessarily perform whatever actions they perform. In response to these objections, many authors argue that God’s willing to crea...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
TheoLogica
Year: 2025, Volume: 9, Issue: 2, Pages: 1-18 |
| Further subjects: | B
Divine Simplicity
B modal collapse argument B divine volition B Divine Knowledge B theory of action |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | The modal collapse argument states that the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity entails that God necessarily creates whatever he creates and also that all creatures necessarily perform whatever actions they perform. In response to these objections, many authors argue that God’s willing to create this precise world and God's knowing everything about individual creatures are at least partially extrinsic or Cambridge properties (i.e., the truthmaker of the respective propositions is, in part, a fact about something contingent other than God). This paper argues for a general view of action, in which such properties can turn out to be at least partially extrinsic. Section 1 explains why responding to the modal collapse argument requires that part of the truthmaker relating God to contingent facts be extrinsic to God, and that it is only in this part that contingency lies. Section 2 argues that this can be generally so in certain class of causal relations, where the agent remains intrinsically the same no matter the precise effect produced. Section 3 shows that free volition is at some level one of those relations, and section 4 offers some brief remarks about the difficulties that still remain in the case of knowledge. |
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| ISSN: | 2593-0265 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: TheoLogica
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.14428/thl.v9i1.82053 |
