Hopeful universalism and the goodness of God: a fittingness approach
Is hopeful universalism a coherent belief for a Christian to hold? Recent criticism of the view has suggested it may not be. Most incisively, Michael Rea has highlighted how hopeful universalism seems to require a Christian to desire a state of affairs "that conflicts with what she believes to...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2025, Volume: 97, Issue: 3, Pages: 235-251 |
| Further subjects: | B
Liberation Theology
B Salvation B Evangelicalism and Pentecostalism B Fittingness B Universalism B Christian Philosophy B Value B Soteriology B Religious Pluralism B Humanism B Secularism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Is hopeful universalism a coherent belief for a Christian to hold? Recent criticism of the view has suggested it may not be. Most incisively, Michael Rea has highlighted how hopeful universalism seems to require a Christian to desire a state of affairs "that conflicts with what she believes to be the perfectly good will of God." While there are versions of the view which are guilty of exactly what Rea alleges, it is not necessary for the hopeful universalist to hold to them. Particularly, hopeful universalism can be understood to consist in a fittingness claim about one’s understanding of God's will which requires no desires in conflict with said will. So, in this paper I argue for such a position, here termed "fittingness hopeful universalism" (FHU). I begin by sketching Rea's critique to outline what we aim to avoid here. Next, I offer a brief survey of universalism's place in theological history to highlight why Christians might prefer hopeful universalism to a more dogmatic version of the view. I then construct FHU to demonstrate one way Christians can avoid the problem Rea highlights while heeding historical theological norms. Finally, I anticipate and respond to two potential objections. Namely, that universalism and non-universalism cannot be co-equal goods, and that the co-equality of universalism and non-universalism would undermine divine goodness. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-025-09953-5 |
