Skeptical-Dogmatists—They’re Just Like Us!
Mark Walker’s Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism argues that philosophers should be humbler: believing their preferred views, as they do, they are committed to representing themselves as vastly epistemically superior to colleagues who disagree with them. I argue to the contrary: belief in one’s preferr...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2025
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2025, 卷: 15, 發布: 2, Pages: 127-147 |
| Further subjects: | B
Belief
B sensitivism B Skeptical-Dogmatism B preface paradox |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| 總結: | Mark Walker’s Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism argues that philosophers should be humbler: believing their preferred views, as they do, they are committed to representing themselves as vastly epistemically superior to colleagues who disagree with them. I argue to the contrary: belief in one’s preferred views is not obviously common, and is compatible with believing one is no more likely than one’s interlocutors to have discovered the truth. I invoke sensitivist models of belief to sketch how belief that p can be made coherent with belief that one is not likely to be correct about whether p. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10097 |
