It’s Not the Slope that Matters: Well-Being and Shapes of Lives

Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs: Hersch, Gil (Auteur) ; Weltman, Daniel (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publié: 2025
Dans: Journal of moral philosophy
Année: 2025, Volume: 22, Numéro: 1/2, Pages: 97-124
Sujets non-standardisés:B Well-being
B momentary well-being
B shape of a life
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Résumé:Many believe that an upward-sloping life is better than a downward-sloping life because of its shape. This is a common way of formulating the shape of a life hypothesis. We argue that the hypothesis is mistaken. We need not assume that there is something intrinsically valuable in the shape of one’s life to justify the tendency to judge an upward-sloping life as better than a downward sloping one. Instead, we can appeal to more fundamental and less controversial claims to justify such a judgment. What one might justifiably judge to be better are features of lives which are often (though not necessarily) correlated with, rather than constituted by, an upward slope.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20244139