The Motion of the Soul: Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great on the Passions

This paper examines Aquinas' and Albert's respective interpretations of the term "motion" in Damasecene's definitions of the passion. Although they have a common understanding of the term within an Aristotelian context, they hold differing attitudes toward it: Albert denies...

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:  
Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Matsumura, Ryosuke (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Φόρτωση...
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Έκδοση: 2024
Στο/Στη: European journal for the study of Thomas Aquinas
Έτος: 2024, Τόμος: 42, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 49-63
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά:B Philosophical psychology
B Motion
B Passion
B Albert the Great
Διαθέσιμο Online: Volltext (kostenfrei)
Volltext (kostenfrei)
Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:This paper examines Aquinas' and Albert's respective interpretations of the term "motion" in Damasecene's definitions of the passion. Although they have a common understanding of the term within an Aristotelian context, they hold differing attitudes toward it: Albert denies that passion is motion, saying that it is quality left from motion, whereas Aquinas affirms the notion of passion as motion. In this paper I expound on the difficulties Albert has with the term and how Aquinas resolves them. I argue that Aquinas successfully addresses the Albert's difficulties, thus establishing a foundation for a more refined understanding of human psychology in relation to ethical behaviour.
ISSN:2657-3555
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: European journal for the study of Thomas Aquinas
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2478/ejsta-2024-0004