To never exist is always best. A critique of the metaphysics of pronatalism in contemporary bioethics
The subject of this paper is a critique of the pronatalist metaphysics that underlies bioethics and shapes the thinking and discourse on reproductive rights. The point of reference is the philosophy of antinatalism presented by Marcus T. L. Teo. Seemingly arguing in favor of antinatalism, Teo mixes...
| Main Author: | |
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| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2025
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| In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2025, Volume: 39, Issue: 1, Pages: 145-150 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCF Sexual ethics NCH Medical ethics NCJ Ethics of science VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
metaphysics of procreation
B Reproductive Rights B pronatalism B antinatalism |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | The subject of this paper is a critique of the pronatalist metaphysics that underlies bioethics and shapes the thinking and discourse on reproductive rights. The point of reference is the philosophy of antinatalism presented by Marcus T. L. Teo. Seemingly arguing in favor of antinatalism, Teo mixes antinatalist concepts with pronatalist intuitions. The consequence of combining the impossible is the restoration of negative eugenics on the one hand, and a series of contradictions on the other. The article shows that philosophical antinatalism is a universal position that indicates that procreation always, everywhere and for everyone is wrong. The paper simultaneously exposes and criticizes the metaphysics of pronatalism underlying bioethical discourse. Weakening pronatalism in bioethics and turning more attention to antinatalism could bring good results for women, the environment, and bioethics itself in terms of its thematic preferences. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "Best to possibly not be: A prudential argument for antinatalism (2024)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13376 |
