On Philip Goff’s case for agentive cosmopsychism
Recently, Philip Goff has argued that the idea of agentive cosmopsychism is the best explanation of cosmic fine-tuning. This idea suggests that our universe is a conscious subject which has capacity to recognize and respond to reasons or facts about value. In this article, by carefully examining the...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2024
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2024, Volume: 96, Issue: 3, Pages: 199-221 |
| Further subjects: | B
Theism
B Cosmopsychism B Fine-tuning |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Recently, Philip Goff has argued that the idea of agentive cosmopsychism is the best explanation of cosmic fine-tuning. This idea suggests that our universe is a conscious subject which has capacity to recognize and respond to reasons or facts about value. In this article, by carefully examining the involved premises in Goff’s argument, we show that two important premises are dubious and not rationally acceptable. Therefore, we conclude that Goff’s argument for agentive cosmopsychism fails. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-024-09931-3 |
