Should Philosophical Reflection on Ethics Do Without Moral Concepts?
Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of de-moralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what ‘de-moralizing’ means. Then the paper assesses Crisp’s argument for de-moralizing and puts forward arguments against de-moralizing.
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| En: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Año: 2024, Volumen: 27, Número: 5, Páginas: 651-665 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCA Ética VB Hermenéutica ; Filosofía XA Derecho |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Justice
B Rights B Coordination rules B Desert B Benevolence B Loyalty B Moral Concepts B Justicia |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Sumario: | Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of de-moralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what ‘de-moralizing’ means. Then the paper assesses Crisp’s argument for de-moralizing and puts forward arguments against de-moralizing. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10303-x |
