Should Philosophical Reflection on Ethics Do Without Moral Concepts?
Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of de-moralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what ‘de-moralizing’ means. Then the paper assesses Crisp’s argument for de-moralizing and puts forward arguments against de-moralizing.
| 1. VerfasserIn: | |
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| Medienart: | Elektronisch Aufsatz |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Verfügbarkeit prüfen: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2024
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Jahr: 2024, Band: 27, Heft: 5, Seiten: 651-665 |
| IxTheo Notationen: | NCA Ethik VB Logik; philosophische Hermeneutik; philosophische Erkenntnislehre XA Recht |
| weitere Schlagwörter: | B
Justice
B Rights B Coordination rules B Desert B Benevolence B Loyalty B Moral Concepts B Fairness |
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Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Zusammenfassung: | Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of de-moralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what ‘de-moralizing’ means. Then the paper assesses Crisp’s argument for de-moralizing and puts forward arguments against de-moralizing. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Enthält: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10303-x |
