Ein Eliminativismus moralischer Eigenschaften auf dem Prüfstand
This article presents a recent argument for moral property eliminativism delivered by Ryan Byerly. He claims that the supervenience of moral truths upon nonmoral facts is best explained by appeal to an ontology that does not include moral entities. If this is so, we have no reason to assume the exis...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2020
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| In: |
Theologie und Philosophie
Year: 2020, Volume: 95, Issue: 4, Pages: 558-571 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Ontology
/ Entity
/ Morals
/ Existence
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| IxTheo Classification: | NBA Dogmatics VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | This article presents a recent argument for moral property eliminativism delivered by Ryan Byerly. He claims that the supervenience of moral truths upon nonmoral facts is best explained by appeal to an ontology that does not include moral entities. If this is so, we have no reason to assume the existence of moral properties. This article displays some weaknesses of this argument and suggests that we need to assume moral principles in order to explain the moral value of actions. Moreover, it argues that moral principles, metaphysically speaking, consist in facts involving moral properties. |
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| ISSN: | 2626-5346 |
| Access: | [DE-21]Open Access |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Theologie und Philosophie
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.60720/thph.v95i4.34794 |