On the incoherence of molinism: incompatibility of middle knowledge with divine immutability
We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only G...
| Autores principales: | ; ; |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| En: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2024, Volumen: 96, Número: 1, Páginas: 23-34 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Molinismo
/ Omnisciencia
/ Inmutabilidad de Dios
|
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Divine immutability
B Molinism B Counterfactuals of creaturely freedom B Incoherency B Divine Will B Middle Knowledge |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | We argue that there is an incompatibility between the two basic principles of Molinism, i.e., God’s middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, and divine immutability. To this end, firstly, we set out the difference between strong and weak immutability: according to the latter only God’s essential attributes remain unchanged, while the former affirms that God cannot change in any way. Our next step is to argue that Molinism ascribes strong immutability to God. However, according to Molinism, some counterfactuals of freedom need to be actualized by divine will. We argue that this claim does entail a change in God because it attributes a knowledge to God that involves moving from possibility to actuality through divine will. Therefore, claiming God knows counterfactuals of freedom leads us to reject the strong sense of divine immutability. Further, we argue that assuming God’s knowledge encompasses counterfactuals of freedom cannot be consistent even with weak immutability because, according to Molinism, a change in God’s knowledge requires a change in His essence. We conclude that Molinism is incoherent. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-024-09906-4 |
