Does the ‘problem of evil’ rest on a mistake?
Philosophers discuss what they call the philosophical ‘problem of evil’ while sometimes making two assumptions. The first is that ‘God is good’ means that God is morally good. The second is that there is no other sense in which God can be good. I argue against both of these assumptions and conclude...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis
2024
|
| In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2024, Volume: 85, Issue: 1/2, Pages: 8–22 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Thomas Aquinas 1225-1274
/ God
/ Creation
/ The Good
/ Evil
/ Morals
|
| IxTheo Classification: | KAE Church history 900-1300; high Middle Ages NBC Doctrine of God NBD Doctrine of Creation NCA Ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
Creation
B Evil B Aquinas B Good B God B Morals |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Philosophers discuss what they call the philosophical ‘problem of evil’ while sometimes making two assumptions. The first is that ‘God is good’ means that God is morally good. The second is that there is no other sense in which God can be good. I argue against both of these assumptions and conclude that the problem of evil, insofar as it depends on their truth, rests on a failure sufficiently to distinguish between God and creatures. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2169-2335 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2024.2353682 |