Rejecting an Additive Solution to Regan’s Lifeboat Case
This paper considers a solution to a scenario found in Tom Regan’s Case for Animal Rights, offered by Daniel Kary. Regan considers a case where either one human or any number of dog’s must be sacrificed. He chooses the human because they would be harmed more than any dog would be. This is initially...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| En: |
Journal of applied animal ethics research
Año: 2024, Volumen: 6, Número: 1, Páginas: 53-72 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
additivity
B inherent value B animal ethics B Intrinsic Value |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | This paper considers a solution to a scenario found in Tom Regan’s Case for Animal Rights, offered by Daniel Kary. Regan considers a case where either one human or any number of dog’s must be sacrificed. He chooses the human because they would be harmed more than any dog would be. This is initially puzzling since Regan claims that humans and dogs have equal inherent value (the objective value as an end that entities have). Kary’s solution argues the human should be saved since their possible experiences have greater intrinsic value (the objective value as an end that experiences have) than those of any number of dogs’. The rationale is that dog experiences are too similar to be additive. The paper acknowledges that Kary’s alternative solution is more plausible than Regan’s, but it ultimately fails to be convincing. |
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| ISSN: | 2588-9567 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Journal of applied animal ethics research
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/25889567-bja10046 |
