If Molinism is true, what can you do?
Suppose Molinism is true and God placed Adam in the garden because God knew Adam would freely eat of the fruit. Suppose further that, had it not been true that Adam would freely eat of the fruit, were he placed in the garden, God would have placed someone else there instead. When Adam freely eats of...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2024
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In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2024, Volume: 95, Issue: 3, Pages: 307-322 |
Further subjects: | B
Molinism
B Middle knowledge theory B Freedom B Self-defeating actions B Counterfactual power |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | Suppose Molinism is true and God placed Adam in the garden because God knew Adam would freely eat of the fruit. Suppose further that, had it not been true that Adam would freely eat of the fruit, were he placed in the garden, God would have placed someone else there instead. When Adam freely eats of the fruit, is he free to do otherwise? This paper argues that there is a strong case for both a positive and a negative answer. Assuming such cases are possible under Molinism, we are left with a puzzling question: if Molinism is true, what can you do? |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-023-09901-1 |